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Abstract 
Nowadays most of documents are held in digital form. Often document repositories or 
databases are used to store the info. The info is getting bigger in size and needs to be 
transferred to partner parties faster. The documents can contain delicate info that not all the 
actors on the partner side should see and edit. This leads to the need of restricting the 
actions that a user can do with the document and see in the document. In this work we 
research possibility to integrate existing technologies to dynamically define forms and their 
security. For the solution we will introduce a dynamic way to define security on XML 
documents. 
As the info transferred might be high in integrity and confidentiality, we need to keep in 
mind that despite restricting and giving permissions to user we must also always keep the 
integrity of the document. In order to fill these needs we will introduce a document 
structure based Role Based Access Control on each of the document’s info element 
together with a merging strategy to keep document’s integrity. 
We will validate the approach with a case study following a set of business scenarios: 
check whether our solution can capture all permissions, roles and subjects from the model 
and whether the document content stays complete when the document is manipulated. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Nowadays more and more documents are held in digital form, either in central document 
repositories or local databases [34]. The amount of data is increasing therefore it is equally 
important to store and transfer the data between parties. The data content can be in 
different confidentiality level. Defining security policies to restrict unauthorized access and 
manipulation of the documents has become necessary.  
Extensible Mark-up Language (XML) [17] is a mark-up language that describes the 
content and the structure of the document.   Documents often contain a vast amount of 
information and their structure is dynamic, therefore it is difficult to apply access 
restriction rules based on document content. Calculation of the documents confidentiality 
level associated access permissions requires extensive computational resources. Security 
policies can be defined for full documents or document categories (i.e. contracts, sales 
orders, public documents). In addition, supplementary permission rules can be defined 
based on the structure of the documents [13, 20, 32].  
Role-based Access Control (RBAC) [25] is a method to generate security in information 
systems depending on the role definition of the user. It provides a methodology to establish 
authorization policies and permissions on resources. However the implementation of 
RBAC is typically done after the information system itself is developed, often leading to 
additional time spent on development. As the documents are stored in web-based 
repositories, and their content is requested via a web service, the security solution needs to 
be applied before the document is sent to the content displaying component. Only 
authorized information should be transferred to avoid security risks.  
As document access permission rules are often defined after the structure and the 
document have already been developed, setting these permission rules is often complex 
and requires developer skills. The underlying thesis evolves around the problem outlined 
above and specifically addresses the following research questions:  
 Can existing technology be integrated to dynamically define forms and security 
without losing context based information? 
More specifically, 
1. Can we dynamically define forms and permissions of the document? 
2. Can we keep the document context complete when applying permissions on 
documents? 
The first sub-question investigates how to define forms and security permissions using 
existing tools. As outcome an architecture solution will be obtained. The second sub-
question addresses how to ensure the document’s completeness throughout its lifecycle.  
As a solution we apply security modelling language – SecureUML [25] to dynamically 
define RBAC policy (forms and permissions) on XML documents and XML Schema based 
form building (DynaForm [29]). Combining XML Schema based form building and 
dynamic permissions on XML structure yields an automatic solution for defining 
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document access permissions, eliminating the need for additional implementations for 
newly created documents. 
Developing the security rules and forms simultaneously simplifies the creation of new 
documents and application of the RBAC solution on them. Here we introduce an 
architectural model where only data permitted by RBAC rules are displayed to the external 
partners to limit the possibility of data access and manipulation by unauthorized parties. To 
validate our results we performed a case study on documents with permissions being 
defined by test subjects using SecureUML. Based on these SecureUML definitions we 
generated code and checked the information and completeness of the test-documents when 
processed.  
The thesis is organised in three parts and eight chapters (Figure 1): 
Part I, Background consists of two chapters dedicated to the theoretical overview of the 
used technologies. Chapter 2: Role-based Access Control (RBAC) and SecureUML defines 
security architecture and security modelling tools used in this thesis to define security 
policies. Chapter 3: Background introduces technologies that are supporting the 
architecture developed in this thesis. 
Part II, Contribution consists of three chapters which define how the system is 
structured, forms are built, permissions are defined and how these three aspects are 
integrated into one solution. Chapter 4: Architecture defines how the technologies 
mentioned above are integrated.  Chapter 5: RBAC and XML-based Forms presents how 
we apply security on documents and how the documents are transformed based on 
permissions applied.. Chapter 6: Modelling and Templates to do RBAC introduces how 
security is modelled using SecureUML and how code is generated from the model. 
Part III, Contribution consists of two chapters dedicated to the validation and conclusion. 
Chapter 7: Case Study reports how we evaluated our research. Chapter 8: Conclusions and 
Future Work presents the conclusion of our research and defines possible future work. 
 
Figure 1 - Structure of the current thesis 
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References include the list of related work used in our research.  
Appendix A describes Velocity template used to generate permissions and XML Schema 
from SecureUML models. 
Appendix B presents Velocity template that is used to generate RBAC permissions from 
SecureUML models. 
Appendix C includes rational database model that is used in our prototype. 
Appendix D presents the source code of our application and models created during 
validation. 
Appendix E introduces case study that was given to our experiment group during 
validation. 
Appendix F shows process diagrams (UMLSec [19]) that were used during our validation. 
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Chapter 2: Role-based Access Control 
and SecureUML 
In this chapter we give an overview of two technologies that mainly used to define security 
policies in this thesis: Role-based Access Control (RBAC) and security modelling 
language SecureUML. 
2.1 Role-based Access Control (RBAC) 
RBAC is a role and permission based architecture to assign rights to subjects (users, 
agents). In our project we will be using flat RBAC [31], which contains of roles, 
permissions, resources and users (subjects). The basic concept of RBAC is that users are 
assigned to roles, permissions are assigned to roles and users acquire permissions by being 
members of roles. One user can have many roles and single user can be assigned to 
multiple users. The rights to a user are defined by a session where the user is authenticated 
and then authorized based on roles to permissions. The permissions define what actions are 
allowed to be done with the resource [25]. 
The resource can be a document or piece of information that is allowed to be manipulated. 
The process of assigning policies to an authenticated subject is described in Figure 2. The 
subject is authenticated and is related through an active session to one-to-many roles which 
are related to permissions. The subject is assigned the permissions in the session and is 
authorized thorough permissions to do actions on resources. 
 
Figure 2 - Flat RBAC (adapted from [31]) 
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2.2 SecureUML 
In this section we will introduce SecureUML modelling language that we used to model 
RBAC on our resources.  
SecureUML is a modelling language that defines a vocabulary for annotating UML-based 
models with information relevant to access control. It is based on the model for RBAC 
with additional support for specifying authorization constraints. SecureUML defines a 
vocabulary for expressing different aspects of access control, like roles, role permissions 
and user-role assignments. Due to its general access-control model and extensibility, 
SecureUML is well suited for business analysis as well as design models for different 
technologies [21].  
The language contains of three main parts [25]: abstract syntax, concrete syntax and 
semantics. We will describe the main parts individually. 
An abstract syntax of SecureUML is organized as a UML class diagram and displayed in 
Figure 3. It adapts the principles of the RBAC model, and introduces concepts like User, 
Role, and Permission as well as relationships RoleAssignment and PermissionAssignment. 
Here secured objects and operations are expressed through protected objects, which are 
modelled using the standard UML constructs (e.g., see concept of ModelElement). In 
addition, ResourceSet represents a user defined set of model elements used to in 
permissions and authorisation constraints [25]. 
 
Figure 3  - SecureUML meta-model (adapted from [7,21,24]) 
The semantics of Permission is defined through ActionType elements used to classify 
permissions. Here every ActionType represents a class of security-relevant operations on a 
particular type of protected resource [25]. In Figure 4 we introduce four specific security 
actions: Read, Write, Insert, and Delete, which we will define later in Chapter 5. 
ResourceType define all possible actions for this type of resource. An 
AuthorisationConstraint expresses a precondition imposed to every call to an operation of 
a particular resource. This precondition usually depends on the dynamic state of the 
resource, the current call, or the environment. The authorization constraint is attached 
either directly or indirectly to a particular model element that represents a protected 
resource [25].  
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Figure 4 - Action types 
At the concrete syntax level SecureUML is a “lightweight extension” of UML, namely 
through stereotypes, tagged values and constraints. The stereotypes are defined for the 
classes and relationships in the class diagrams and are specifically oriented to the RBAC 
terminology [25]. In Figure 5 we illustrate the SecureUML concrete syntax through the 
Medical Records permissions example. 
  
Figure 5 – MedicalRecord permissions with SecureUML 
Figure 5 defines security for resource MedicalRecord which has eleven attibutes. Five of 
them describe the patient: name, legalCode, aadress, married, age. All these information 
units must be secured from unauthorized accesses.  
We also have two roles: Secretary  and Nurse. Their permissions to MedicalRecord 
resource are described through association classes SecretaryPermission and 
NursePermission. 
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To associate the permission attribute with the resource attributes we use authorization 
constraints, which are defined as abstract relations between them: 
 viewApproved -> approved 
 writePatientInfo -> name 
 writePatientInfo -> legalCode 
 writePatientInfo -> address 
 writePatientInfo -> married 
 writePatientInfo -> age 
 insertServices -> service 
 deleteServices -> service 
Based on SecretaryPermission class the role Secretary permissions: 
 action viewApproved (of type Read) defines that Secretary can read resource field 
approved (see class MedicalRecord); 
 action writePatientInfo (of type Write) allows changing name, legalCode, address, 
married and age  (see class MedicalRecord); 
 action insertServices (of type Insert) allows adding new elements with tag name 
service (see class MedicalRecord); 
 action deleteServices (of type Delete) allows to remove elements with tag name 
service (see class MedicalRecord). 
In [8] semantics of Secure UML is formalised to satisfy two purposes: first to define a 
declarative access control decisions that depend on static information, namely the 
assignments of users and permissions to roles, and secondly to support implementation-
based access control decisions that depend on dynamic information, namely, the 
satisfaction of authorisation constraints in the current system state [25]. Similarly to [2, 15] 
we discuss SecureUML semantics in respect to system modelling. We make use of the 
RBAC model to define semantics of the SecureUML constructs [23, 24] as illustrated in 
Table 1. Some mappings between RBAC and SecureUML are understood as a lexical 
correspondence. For example, the SecureUML classes with the stereotype 
<<secuml.user>> correspond to the RBAC users, <<secuml.role>> to the RBAC roles, 
and <secuml.permission>> to the RBAC permissions. These SecureUML constructs and 
RBAC concepts are similar according to their textual expression, and also their semantic 
application (see MedicalRecord in Figure 5). 
Subjects to be protected are defined as classes with stereotype<<secuml.resource>>. In 
RBAC notation they are called as objects. Operations that can be applied on the objects 
that are defined as <<secuml.resource>> class operations in SecureUML and as 
operations in RBAC. For RBAC role assignment we use association class between 
<<secuml.role>> (i.e. Secretary) and <<secuml.resource>> (i.e. MedicalRecord class). The 
permission assignment in SecureUML is described with association classes which defines 
actions that can be used on the associated resource elements. 
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Table 1 - Correspondence between RBAC concepts and secureUML constucts (based on [25]) 
RBAC concepts SecureUML contruct  MedicalRecord example 
Users 
(concept) 
Class stereotype 
<<secuml.user>> 
Class Users 
Users assignment 
(relationship) 
Association between 
classes with stereotypes 
<<secuml.user>> and 
<<secuml.role>> 
Association relatsionship 
[hasBeenAssignedTo-
assignedSecretary] and 
[hasBeenAssignedTo-
assignedNurse] 
 
Roles 
(concept) 
Class stereotype 
<<secuml.role>> 
Classes Secretary and Nurse 
Permission assignment 
(relationship) 
Associations class 
stereotype 
<<secuml.permission>> 
Operations of associated 
classes 
InitiatorPermissions and 
ParticipantPermissions 
Objects 
(concept) 
Class stereotype 
<<secuml.resource>> 
Class MedicalRecord 
Operations 
(concept) 
Operations of a class 
with stereotype 
<<secuml.resource>> 
Operations 
readName(), writeName(), 
readLegalCode(), 
writeLegalCode(), 
readAddress(), readMarried, 
etc. 
Permission  
(concept) 
Authorization constraint Abstract relations: 
viewApproved -> approved 
writePatientInfo -> name 
writePatientInfo -> legalCode 
writePatientInfo -> address 
writePatientInfo -> married 
writePatientInfo -> age 
insertServices -> service 
deleteServices -> service 
2.3 Summary 
In this chapter we introduced Role-based Access Control model and SecureUML 
modelling language. We discussed the associations between RBAC and SecureUML and 
defined the semantics to model RBAC. In the next chapter we will describe the existing 
tools we used to support our work. 
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Chapter 3: Background 
In this chapter we define the main concepts and technologies that are used in the thesis. We 
will first cover the main technologies and then in the next chapter define how we use the 
technologies to support our work. 
3.1 Extensible Mark-up Language  
More and more data is stored today which leads to the need to store and transfer the data 
structurally. One possible format to use when transporting and storing data and documents 
is Extensible Mark-up Language (XML) [17].   XML is often used to transfer data to 
visible layer or between parties. In our work we use XML to store and transfer our data. 
We choose XML as it is understandable for humans and machines, and is platform 
independent.  
XML was developed by an XML Working Group formed under the auspices of the World 
Wide Web Consortium (W3C) in 1996 [17].  A sample XML document is given as Figure 
6. The main line of the XML defines the XML version to be used and the encoding the 
proceeding document is given in. We have main node file which contains two main child 
elements header and content, which both also have sub-elements. We can see that the data 
type in the fields is different: field created is containing date format content, createdBy 
contains data of type string and isAccepted fields contains a boolean value. To define the 
rules which kind of data can be inserted to a field we use XML Schema. 
 
Figure 6 – XML document 
3.2 XML Schema  
The structure of an XML document can be defined as a Document Type Definition (DTD) 
or XML Schema [35]. DTD contains info about the structure of the XML, but the XML 
Schema can contain info about the elements multiplicity, availability and type. The main 
limitation of DTD is that it is not itself a well-form and valid XML document. An 
additional special parser is needed when processing DTD and XML [32].  XML Schema 
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itself is a document that has needs to have a certain structure to be valid. For parsing XML 
Schema regular XML parsers can be used. For example XPath [36] or XQuerty [37]. XML 
Schema was published as a W3C recommendation in May 2001 [35]. It defines the 
structure and the rules which the respected XML document has to fill in order to be 
considered to be valid. It helps to validate the document before processing to ensure that it 
contains all needed elements.  
An example XML Schema that validates our previously presented XML is given in Figure 
7. The structure of the file is presented with the help of Altova XMLSpy
 
[1] to define the 
schema. We can see that the document must contain of one element named files and then 
one to many elements of documents. The documents must contain of header and content.  
 
Figure 7 - XML Schema structure 
If we look at the text definition (Figure 8) we can see the data types of each value and that 
content, header and document are defined as separate types.  HeaderType contains 
elements created, createdBy and documentVersion. Element created is of type xs:date 
(where xs is the namespace) and is mandatory (minOccurs attribute not defined); createdBy 
is of type xs:string and is not mandatory; documentVersion is of type xs:long  and is 
mandatory.  
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Figure 8 - XML Schema text definition 
3.3 DynaForm 
Dynaform is a Dynamic Schema-Based Web Forms Generation in Java developed by 
Raudjärv [29]. It uses XML Schema to dynamically define forms and also uses Domain-
Specific Language (DSL) [14] to specify the restrictions for the form, i.e. the length of a 
value. The form works by XML Schema, DynaData (DSL) and the form data. DynaForm 
Web form building is based on XForms [33] and presented with the help of Aranea 
framework and Java Servlets. We use the XML Schema based form builder as out central 
tool to display the form.  
Figure 9 illustrates the inputs and outputs of DynaForm. XML schema is set as input based 
on what the web structure will be built. A presentation specific definition DynaData can be 
used to customize rendering the form. XML Instance can be used to pre-populate values to 
the form.  
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Figure 9 - DynaForm input and output (adapted from [29]) 
The DynaForm supports a limited number of XML Schema elements. They have chosen to 
focus on representative subset of XML Schema definition elements [29]. 
The supported subset of XML Schema should fulfil the following requirements [29]:  
 The set of XML Schema elements allowed in the input of DynaForm are:  <all>, 
<attribute>, <choice>, <element>, <sequence>.  
 Reoccurring XML Schema elements (minOccurs and maxOccurs attributes) are 
also allowed.  
 The supported XML Schema simple data types are:  
1. String data types: string.  
2. Date data types: date, time, datetime.  
3. Numeric data types: integer, long, int, short, byte, decimal.  
4. Miscellaneous data types: boolean.  
DynaForms is the central presentation technology that we use to display forms. 
3.4 Other tools 
Velocity [5] is a Java-based template engine. It permits anyone to use a simple yet 
powerful template language to reference objects defined in Java code. The template defines 
the structure and the layout of the document with placeholders for Java objects. 
Placeholders will be defined from Java object and when processing the template Velocity 
will replace the placeholders with values from Java objects.  
Velocity's capabilities reach well beyond the realm of the web; for example, it can be used 
to generate SQL and XML from templates. It can be used either as a standalone utility for 
generating source code and reports, or as an integrated component of other systems [5]. We 
use Velocity to generate SQL and XML Schemas from class diagrams. 
MagicDraw [22] is business process, architecture, software and system modelling tool 
with teamwork support. Designed for Business Analysts, Software Analysts, Programmers, 
QA Engineers, and Documentation Writers, this dynamic and versatile development tool 
facilitates analysis and design of Object Oriented systems and databases. We use 
MagicDraw as our modelling tool. 
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ECLA XmlMerge [16] module is implemented to merge two or more XML documents 
together. We use the tool to merge two document versions into one without losing the data 
that was not displayed to the user.  
Apache Tomcat is an open source software implementation of the Java Servlet and Java 
Server Pages technologies [4]. The servers are widely used on small and enterprise 
solutions. For out project we use Tomcat on both: client and server side. Version 6.0 is 
used on client side and latest stable version 7.0 on server side.   
The Apache Axis2 [3] project is a Java-based implementation of both the client and server 
sides of the Web services equation. The main reason for using the tool is that it supports 
sending Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) messages, receiving and processing SOAP 
messages, creating Web services out a Java class, creating client and server side Web 
Service Definition Language (WSDL) implementations dynamically. It is used to transfer 
the documents and document requests between client and server. 
MySQL [27] is an open source relational database management system. It is available 
under the General Public License and is supported by a huge and active community of 
open source developers. 
3.5 Summary 
In this chapter we introduced main existing technologies and concepts used in our work: 
XML, XML Schema, DynaForm, Velocity, MagicDraw, ELCA XmlMerge, Apache 
Tomcat,Apache Axis2 and MySQL We describe the technology usage in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Architecture  
In this chapter we introduce the architecture of our solution. First we discuss the high level 
architecture and then specify the solution in server and client side and integration 
separately.  Additionally we go through the XML documents transformation and merging 
strategies. 
4.1 Technologies integration 
Figure 10 introduces how the used technologies are related to each other. The server 
machine contains info about the forms and forms data. The client displays the form using 
DynaForm and sends the saved data to the server. In the server machine the XML 
document and XML Schema RBAC transformations are performed based on the role and 
requested form from the client side. The client and the server are treated as trusted parties.  
The connection between these two parties is not encrypted and is supported by Axis2. The 
client machine does not store any form-related info or form responses. 
 
Figure 10 – Architecture solution   
The client side contains of three parts: a Web Server (Apache Tomcat 6.0), DynaForm and 
web services clients (Axis2 clients). The client side is responsible for displaying the data 
got from server and sending the changed data back to the server. 
DynaForm is used to display the form to the client, to collect values from the forms and 
send them to the server. The client server displays the requested form and validates it 
against XML Schema (with DynaForm) rules and if client side rules are accepted, the 
result is sent to the server. We have implemented the DynaForm not to save any data 
locally, but send all the data to integration services which sends the data to the server. 
The server side is responsible for storing the data, permission, form definitions, 
transforming the documents and XML Schemas based on the role permissions and sending 
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it to the client. When modifying the document the server is also responsible for merging 
the existing document with the modified one. As suggested in [12] the server side is 
responsible for processing the permissions.  This avoids any security risks in the client 
side. 
The server has four main services that the client side uses:  
getForms(roles) – returns the list of documents available for the roles with the documents 
permissions. The data is used to display an existing XML document to the user. 
getXsdForms(roles) – returns the list of possible new documents to the user with XML 
Schema level permissions. The returned data is used to create a new document for the user. 
updateForm(XML, user, XML Schema) – is a service that is used to update an existing 
document in the system. 
addNewForm(XML, user, XML Schema) – a service that is used to add a new document to 
the system. 
Server runs on Apache Tomcat 7 server which contains Axis2 integration library. 
 
The integration between server and client is done through integration messages and with 
the help of Axis2 integration engine. The messages are sent synchronously, meaning each 
message will be waiting for a response [6].  
The security between parties is not in the scope and the integration partners are treated as 
being trusted.  
4.2 Document transformation and transportation 
In this paragraph we describe the process to securely provide XML document to the end-
user. After introducing the main process we describe each process step in detail.  
We implement RBAC on XML documents based on document’s structure. The XML 
documents can be big in size, so we will not implement RBAC on XML level as this might 
cause poor performance due to the vast amount of data to be processed. We define the 
rules on XML Schema level and calculate the XML for each role group beforehand, as the 
number or different rights combinations can be large. We calculate it before the document 
is requested from the server. 
Figure 11 displays the document and its associated resources. Every XML document in the 
server side has a XML Schema assigned to it, which refer to the structure of the document 
and will be used to display the form in the client side. Every XML Schema can also have 
assigned a list of permissions which limits the actions that can be done with the document 
by subjects with different roles. 
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Figure 11 - XML with XML schema and Permissions 
If a request from client side is initiated, then the role of active user is sent to the server. 
The process is described in Figure 12. After the server receives the request for a document, 
the server checks if there are any permission restrictions for the associated document. If 
exists then it will transform based on the permissions the XML and XML Schema and 
return them to the client. The client will display the form based on XML Schema and fill it 
with data from XML. 
 
Figure 12 - Request a Document 
When the client saves the document it will be sent back to the server and be merged 
together with the original XML document (Figure 13).  The merging strategies are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
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Figure 13 - Save a document and merge in server 
4.3 Discussion 
There exist architecture solutions in securing documents. In [32] Sandhu suggests having a 
separate security administration part which contains of an authorization server that is 
connected to role server and policy server. A server would be responsible for authorization 
and the requested XML transportation. In our case the authorization and session handling 
is in the client side and for simplicity we transfer only role level information to the XML 
Schema transformation server. There also exists work related to XML security. 
Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) has 
developed Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [30] in XML to transfer security 
information: permissions, authorizations and authentications, but does not restrict directly 
XML data. Extensible Access Control Markup Language [28] (XACML) provides a 
method to define access controls based on sets of policies. XACML is similar to our work 
to define rules on XML elements level. The difference to XACML is that we use a specific 
control mode – RBAC to secure our resources as in [32]. XACML has no specific access 
control method model supported. Work in [12] is similar to ours by architecture: Samarati 
suggest having all permission calculations in server side and giving out only information 
for the server that the users are authorized to, but they define rules on DTD, not on XML 
Schema. 
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter we described the architecture of our solution from client side, server side 
and from integration. We introduced the documents transformation and merging strategy 
from the architecture perspective. Also, we pointed out architecture related work in XML 
security. In the next chapter we will describe how RBAC is applied on XML Schema.  
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Chapter 5: RBAC on XML Schema 
based forms  
In this chapter we will describe how RBAC is applied on XML Schema. Firstly, we will 
define permissions using defined Domain Specific Language [14], secondly introduce 
possible actions, and thirdly discuss XML and XML Schema transformation rules together 
with document merging strategies and finally we will illustrate it with an example. 
5.1 Defining RBAC on elements 
To secure the XML documents RBAC is implemented in the XML Schema level. 
Permissions in an XML Schema document can be defined in the level of elements which 
do not have any child elements themselves. Figure 14 displays XML Schema for a 
document with 11 elements which do not have any child elements: name, legalCode, 
address, married, age, complaint, primaryDiagnosis, opinion, service, observation and 
approved. These are also elements which are displayed on the input form.   
To define the role based access control for each of these elements we define a new Domain 
Specific Language (DSL) [14].  
{Role}<>{element}>>{permissions}<break> 
Each user can be assigned to one role and the role is provided by the client to the server. 
The {Role} field is case sensitive and has to match in both parties. Server checks for the 
access rights requested to the document. The {element} field name has to match the local 
name of the field: in the XML Schema the element attribute property name without the 
namespace. For example in Figure 14 name, legalCode, etc. should be used. For 
{permissions} we can define four actions: Read, Write, Insert and Delete. In the notation 
we use them as “R,W,I,D”. This kind of notation means that all these permissions are 
granted. Notation “R,W,-,D” means that it is allowed to read, write and delete. <break> is 
used to distinguish permission granting rights from each other.  
One permission grant to read and write address field can be defined as: 
Admin<>address>>R,W,-,-<break>. 
5.2 Action definitions 
Role can have four different permissions on an element: 
  
 Read (R) – element value is visible. 
 Write (W) – If the element is visible then it is allowed to change the value. 
 Insert (I) – If multiple sections allowed, then allows adding another section. 
 Delete (D) – Allowed to remove elements more frequent in data XML, than in 
the XML Schema definition. 
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Figure 14 - Permissions on element level 
Write permission is a prerequisite order to be able to add a new section. Read permission is 
a prerequisite in order to be able to write, insert and delete the element. Table 2 describes 
the permissions that can be assigned to manipulate an element. It is also illustrated with 
examples for XML Schema and XML. The transformations are done based on four actions.  
Read permission is defined by attribute fixed. It specifies that the form element is in read-
only mode. The attribute with value true is added only if the actor does not have 
additionally writing permission and the field is of type boolean or string.  Value 0 is added 
if the field is of numeric type. 
When Write permission is granted, then element is displayed as editable. 
Insert permission controls the maximum number of occurrences that element can be in the 
document. Inserting is possible if the maxOccurs attribute’s value in XML Schema is 
bigger than the number of elements occurrences in the document. Inserting right gives the 
permission to add the elements as many times as it is in the XML Schema definition. If the 
user does not have inserting permission then the value of attribute maxOccurs is calculated 
based on the number of times the element is used in the XML document. I.e If the address 
element exists 3 times in the XML and in the form schema it is allowed to define 5 times. 
Then in the transformed XML Schema the maxOccurs attribute value is set to 3. 
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Delete permission controls if it is allowed to delete the existing element. Deleting is 
possible if the attribute minOccurs value in XML Schema is smaller than occurrence of 
existing elements in the XML. Deleting right gives the permission to remove elements 
from the XML which are more frequent in the XML than permitted in the XML Schema. If 
the user does not have deleting right then the value of minOccurs is calculated based on the 
occurrences of the element in the XML. I.e If the address element exists 3 times in the 
XML and in the form schema it is required to define at least once, then XML Schema 
minOccurs attribute value is set to 3. 
Table 2 - Permission descriptions 
Permission XML Schema XML 
READ <xs:element name="address" 
fixed="true" 
type="xs:string"/> 
<address>String</address> 
WRITE <xs:element name="address" 
type="xs:string"/> 
<address>String</address> 
INSERT <xs:element name="address" 
type="xs:string" 
maxOccurs="2"/> 
<address>String</address> 
<address>String</address> 
DELETE <xs:element name="address" 
type="xs:string" 
maxOccurs="3"/> 
<address>String</address> 
<address>String</address> 
<address>String</address> 
5.3 XML and XML Schema transformations 
In this paragraph we will describe the process in order to transform the XML document 
and XML Schema respect to the permissions. The process is described as a Flowchart 
(legend defined in [11]) in Figure 15. The process can be separated into three main steps: 
transforming minOccurs and maxOccurs attributes, fixing read-only fields, removing fields 
from XML and XML Schema that the role does not have access Read. The first two steps 
are manipulating only XML Schema. The third one is manipulating also XML data.  
First, we find all the elements in the XML Schema that have minOccurs or maxOccurs 
attributes. For each this element we also find how many times the element occurs in the 
XML data. After finding all the elements we check if the role has Delete permission.   If it 
does we set the element attribute minOccurs value equal XML Schema attribute value 
(value in the original XML Schema). If the role does not have the Delete permission, we 
will set the attribute value to the number of times the element existed in the original XML 
document.  Next we check if the role has Insert permission to the element. If it does, then 
we set the attribute maxOccurs to the XML Schema value (value in the original XML 
Schema). If the role does not have the permission, we will set the attribute value to the 
number of times the element existed in the original XML document. After finishing the 
process for one element we will check if there exist more multi-occurrence elements. If it 
did then we check the values again for the new element. If not, we will proceed. 
After multi-occurrence elements have been all checked we will continue to find elements 
which the role has Read permission, but does not have Write permission. For all these 
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elements we will add an attribute fixed = “true” to the XML Schema. It states that the 
value is fixed and cannot be changed – it is read-only. 
  
Figure 15 - XML and XML Schema transformation flowchart 
After fixing read-only fields we will continue with finding elements that the role does not 
have Read permission. These elements should not be visible to the role and will be 
removed from the XML Schema and XML data. After removing the elements we might 
come to a point where the parent element does not have any more child elements (all child 
elements are removed), then we also remove the parent element in order to keep the XML 
Schema valid. We also remove the elements from XML data to keep it valid respect to 
XML Schema.  
In this paragraph we described the process of permissions structure, possible actions and 
transformations to the XML Schema and XML data. After all the transformation process is 
finished the transformed XML Schema and transformed XML are sent to the client. 
5.4 XML merging rules 
After the transformed XML Schema and XML data is received in the client side the user 
can modify the existing data and send it back to the server for storage. 
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When a XML document is saved, then the document can be limited based on permissions 
(all element that the role does not have permission to read are removed). In order to keep 
the document complete we merge the documents in the server side. We use the original 
XML and the new saved document received from the client and merges them with ELCA 
module XmlMerge [16] with merging strategy replace. 
Replace strategy means that it will replace the original with the saved XML element or 
create a new element if it does not exist in the original XML. This solution has also one 
limitation: when the element is not under main element (root element in the examples) and 
is not in the saved XML, the value will be removed during merging the XML (Table 3 row 
4).  Each time we save a document we take the original XML and merge it with saved 
XML from client. Examples are given in Table 3. 
Table 3 - XML merging examples 
Original XML Saved XML Merged XML Comment 
<root> 
   <a>Value</a> 
   <b/> 
</root> 
 
<root> 
   <a/> 
   <b>Value</b> 
</root> 
<root> 
   <a/> 
   <b>Value</b> 
</root> 
 
Element values are 
overridden. 
<root> 
   <a/> 
   <b/> 
   <b>Value</b> 
</root> 
 
<root> 
   <a/> 
   <a>Value</a> 
   <b/> 
</root> 
 
<root> 
   <a/> 
   <a>Value</a> 
   <b/> 
</root> 
 
If an element exists in saved 
XML, then value is replaced 
or deleted if the element is 
not present. 
<root> 
   <a/> 
   <b/> 
   <b>Value</b> 
</root> 
 
<root> 
   <a/> 
   <a>Value</a> 
</root> 
 
<root> 
   <a/> 
   <a>Value</a> 
   <b>Value</b> 
</root> 
 
If an element does not exist 
in saved XML, then it is not 
deleted from the original  
XML document if it is 
under main element. 
<root> 
   <a> 
        
<b>Value</b> 
        
<c>Value</c> 
   </a> 
</root> 
 
<root> 
   <a> 
        
<c>Value</c> 
   </a> 
</root> 
 
<root> 
   <a> 
           
<c>Value</c> 
   </a> 
</root> 
 
If an element does not exist 
in saved XML, then it is 
deleted from the original  
XML document if it not 
under main element. 
5.5 An example of XML and XML Schema transformation 
In the client side we always display all the info we get from the server, all the 
transformation of XML document and XML Schema are done in the server side. As 
defined previously we have four main actions Read, Write, Insert and Delete. We will 
describe the action transformations of XML and XML Schema based on an example. 
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Lets’ assume we have a simple XML Schema described in Figure 17; a role Secretary  who 
can read and write fields: name, legalCode, address, married, age. Read, write, insert and 
delete field service and only read fields observation and approved. The definition of role 
Secretary permissions in our MySQL [27] database are given in Table 4. There also exists 
a XML document for that schema. Example document XML is described in Figure 16. 
Table 4 - Permissions for role Secretary 
Secretary<>name>>R,W,-,-<break> 
Secretary<>legalCode>>R,W,-,-<break> 
Secretary<>address>>R,W,-,-<break> 
Secretary<>married>>R,W,-,-<break> 
Secretary<>age>>R,W,-,-<break> 
Secretary<>service>>R,W,I,D<break> 
Secretary<>observation>>R,-,-,-<break> 
Secretary<>approved>>R,-,-,-<break> 
We will first find all the elements that in XML Schema have an attribute minOccurs or 
maxOccurs describe the multiplicity of an element. From Figure 17 we can see that these 
elements are service and observation. Element service occurs in the XML document three 
times and observation two times. The occurrences are taken into account when Insert and 
Delete rights are calculated. For field Service the actor can Insert and Delete, therefore we 
do not change the XML Schema definition. For field observation the user does not have 
Insert nor Delete permissions. Therefore the maximum number of allowed observations 
must equal the number of elements existing in the XML and the minimum number of 
allowed observations must also equal the number of elements existing in the XML - two.  
<xs:element name="service" type="xs:string" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
<xs:element name="observation" type="xs:string" minOccurs="2" maxOccurs="2"/> 
Next we will look for elements where the role has Read permission, but does not have 
Write permission. These elements are displayed as read only. These elements are 
observation and approved. For these elements we will add to the XML Schema attribute 
fixed with value “true” if it is of type string or boolean and “0” if it is numeric. 
<xs:element name="observation" type="xs:string" minOccurs="2" maxOccurs="2" 
fixed="true"/> 
<xs:element name="approved" type="xs:boolean" fixed="true"/> 
 
Figure 16 – Main XML Document 
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Figure 17 – Main XML Document Schema 
As the last transformation we find all elements where the role does not have Read 
permission. These elements will be removed from the XML Schema and also from the 
XML document. These elements are complaint, primaryDiagnosis and opinion. As by 
removing all these fields the element anamnesis would be empty in the XML Schema, we 
also remove the parent element (Lines 18-26 in Figure 17 are removed). After removing 
the elements that the role cannot read, we have XML Schema as defined in Figure 18. We 
also remove all XML document elements where the user does not have Read permission. 
As the XML Schema the parent element was empty after removing the elements we also 
removed the parent element anamnesis from the XML data. The final XML document is 
displayed as Figure 19. 
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Figure 18 – Transformed XML Schema 
 
Figure 19 - Transformed XML document 
After all the transformations are finished the transformed XML Schema and transformed 
XML are sent to the client. 
The existing form based on the transformed XML Schema and XML document is 
displayed in Figure 20. Elements observation and approved are in read-only mode, and 
elements complaint, primaryDiagnosis and opinion are not displayed. 
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Figure 20 - Transformed XSD and XML based form 
The user can add and change name, legalCode, address, married, age and can add or delete 
service elements. For example user changes field legalCode value to “112233” and adds a 
new service “20x25mg paracetamol”. After saving we merge the two documents in order 
to keep the info that was not visible to the end user due to role permissions in the document 
and add the changes and additional elements that were changed by the user. The 
documents will be merged in the server to a new document version. 
In Figure 21 the existing document in the server and the document sent by the client are 
displayed. The sent document is missing the anamnesis element with its sub-elements and 
has changed value in legalCode field and has one additional service element.  
In the merging process field legalCode will be replaced by the value in the client side 
XML. As the anamnesis block is missing in the client side document, the values are taken 
from the original XML in the server. The added service field will also be added to the 
document in the server. Finally, in the database we will have merged XML document as 
described in Figure 21.  
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Document in the server Client side saved and sent document to 
server 
<root> 
   <patient> 
     <name>Smith, Johan</name> 
     <legalCode>322120102</legalCode> 
     <address>234c Baker St.</address> 
     <married>true</married> 
     <age>55</age> 
   </patient> 
   <anamnesis> 
     <complaint> Head ache</complaint> 
     <primaryDiagnosis>K22.1 Consistent head-
ache</primaryDiagnosis> 
     <opinion/> 
   </anamnesis> 
   <services> 
     <service>Specialist appointment</service> 
     <service>Observation: Cholesterol, 
Lipid</service> 
     <service>Observation: Blood glucose </service> 
 
   </services> 
   <observations> 
     <observation>Cholesterol and Lipid 
Levels:OK</observation> 
     <observation>Diabetes (blood glucose): too 
low</observation> 
   </observations> 
   <approved>true</approved> 
 </root> 
 
<root> 
  <patient> 
    <name>Smith, Johan</name> 
    <legalCode>112233</legalCode> 
    <address>234c Baker St.</address> 
    <married>true</married> 
    <age>55</age> 
  </patient> 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  <services> 
    <service>Specialist appointment</service> 
    <service>Observation: Cholesterol, 
Lipid</service> 
    <service>Observation: Blood glucose </service> 
    <service>20x25mg paracetamol</service> 
  </services> 
  <observations> 
    <observation>Cholesterol and Lipid 
Levels:OK</observation> 
    <observation>Diabetes (blood glucose): too 
low</observation> 
  </observations> 
  <approved>true</approved> 
</root> 
Merged XML document 
<root> 
   <patient> 
     <name>Smith, Johan</name> 
     <legalCode>112233</legalCode> 
     <address>234c Baker St.</address> 
     <married>true</married> 
     <age>55</age> 
   </patient> 
   <anamnesis> 
     <complaint>Head ache</complaint> 
     <primaryDiagnosis>K22.1 Consistent head-ache</primaryDiagnosis> 
     <opinion /> 
   </anamnesis> 
   <services> 
     <service>Specialist appointment</service> 
     <service>Observation: Cholesterol, Lipid</service> 
     <service>Observation: Blood glucose</service> 
     <service>20x25mg paracetamol</service> 
   </services> 
   <observations> 
     <observation>Cholesterol and Lipid Levels:OK</observation> 
     <observation>Diabetes (blood glucose): too low</observation> 
   </observations> 
   <approved>true</approved> 
 </root> 
Figure 21 - Merge documents 
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5.6 Discussion 
There has been some related work to secure XML documents based on content or structure 
of the document. Sandhu et al. in [32] define RBAC on Document Type Definition and 
XML Schema. The work is similar to ours:  they also have four main actions and calculate 
permissions on elements level, but they do not transform the XML Schemas together with 
XML document, assuming that the output schema is already known. Samarati et al. in [13] 
and Diamani et al. in [12] define access control on DTD level. Samarati uses XML Access 
Control List to specify the permissions, Diamani X-path expressions. We use our own 
defined domain specific language. Bertino et al. in [9] defines XML based RBAC policy 
specification framework – X-RBAC. It is not used to secure XML documents but to 
control access in dynamic XML-based web services. X-RBAC has also a Java based GUI-
enabled application to define the rules. Bertino et al. in [8] define a Java based system for 
access control to XML sources – Author X. It can be used to secure XML documents 
directly and documents based on their Document Type Definition. Crampton in [10] 
creates separate security views with X-path and XQuery to secure documents. Murata et al. 
in [26] define static methods to secure documents so that it would not be needed to 
calculate visible fields in a schema every time, as there might exists policies that are 
common for all roles. Using static methods could also be a future work to improve our 
solution.  
5.7 Summary 
In this paragraph we described the four possible actions to assign role permissions to 
elements in XML, introduced XML Schema and XML transformation rules and proposed a 
method how to merge original XML and edited XML into one new document without 
losing the document’s completeness. After describing the process steps we illustrated it 
with an example on simplified healthcare diary record. In the next chapter we will describe 
the modelling of RBAC permissions using SecureUML and how to generate needed output 
from the models. 
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Chapter 6:  Modelling & Templates to 
do RBAC 
In this chapter we will define rules to model RBAC for dynamic forms using SecureUML. 
For defining the rules we assume that there already exists a definition for a form in the 
system and it needs additional security to be applied or is simple to be modelled. If the 
XML Schema has only complex types of elements of simple types – in this case we will 
also be able to generate the XML Schema directly from the SecureUML model. 
At first we will introduce used stereotypes, rules to define each stereotype and then how 
the objects are associated to each other. We will illustrate the usage with MagicDraw usage 
for SecureUML. 
6.1 Stereotypes 
As SecureUML [21] uses stereotypes that are not defined UML, we will introduce new 
stereotypes (discussed in Chapter 2) to cover the needed notation: 
 <<secuml.resource>> - This stereotype is applied to a class that defines the unit to 
be secured. 
 <<secuml.role>> - This stereotype is applied to a class that defines the actor’s role 
in the process. 
 <<secuml.permission>> - This stereotype is applied to an association class that 
defines the relationship between the role and the resource. 
For XML Schema we will introduce an additional stereotype: 
 <<xml.schema>> - This stereotype is applied to a class that defines the main form 
class. 
The stereotypes will cover RBAC resources, roles and permissions. 
6.2 SecureUML Resources 
In SecureUML resources are classes with stereotype <<secuml.resource>>. We will 
define a form that needs to be secured as a separate class. The name of the class can be 
chosen freely. The attributes of the class are ID and form elements. ID is a special attribute 
which default value has to match the forms primary key identifier in the database (MySQL 
database structure given in Appendix C).  Form element attributes must contain all XML 
Schema elements which do not have any child elements. The name of the attribute must 
match the name of the XML Schema element name tag. We also define the operations to 
the form class object to describe the possible actions for each element. The operations are 
illustrative and will not be used in the transformation from UML to SQL. In Figure 22 we 
have defined a form with ID= 201 and ten different elements (with types string, int, 
boolean) on the form, also some possible operations are pointed out.  
  
39 
 
 
Figure 22 - Resource class 
6.3 XML Schema Resources Limitations 
The XML Schema has some limitations based on DynaForm and modelling. To generate 
an XML Schema the class of type <<xml.schema>> (class Form) can contain elements of 
types defines in Chapter 3 and complex elements defines in the same diagram. It is 
important that when modelling the complex element (class Patient) should not contain 
different element types than in Chapter 3.   
6.4 Roles 
In SecureUML roles are classes with stereotype <<secuml.role>>. The class name must 
match the role name used when requesting the form. Additional attributes and operations 
can be defined but they will be ignored when transforming the model. An example model 
for role ADMIN is displayed in Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23 - Role class 
6.5 Permissions 
In SecureUML permissions are association classes with stereotype 
<<secuml.permission>>. Permissions are associations between role and resource object 
classes.  The permission groups are defined as attributes. The class type for the attribute 
has to be one of four actions: Read, Write, Insert or Delete. The name of the attribute is 
chosen freely. The association between the permission and form field (stereotype 
secuml.resource class) is defined via abstract association between a certain permission 
attribute and form attribute.  To define all four action permission there must be defined at 
least four attributes with everyone with a different action type class. Figure 24 displayed an 
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example permission class with four action types.  Also we can see that attribute viewName 
gives actually Read permission for fields: address, married and name. 
 
Figure 24 - Permission class 
6.6 Template 
To generate permissions from XML Schema we use templates in Velocity [5] language 
(interpretable by MagicDraw modelling tool) to transform the class diagrams into SQL 
update sentences the can be executed in the SQL console (database pre-configuration is 
given in Appendix C).  Appendix A describes the transformer to generate the XML 
Schema and the permissions from class diagrams. The algorithm used to capture 
permissions from class diagram is given in the end of the paragraph. Using the transformer 
the XML Schema limitations apply. If the form should be more complex (have more than 2 
level structures), then the XML Schema should be generated with a different tool i.e. 
Altova XML Spy. In this case only the XML Schema limitations by DynaForm will apply 
and template in Appendix B should be used for updating permissions.  Both cases 
limitations are described in Chapter 3. The main benefit from modelling XML Schema 
together with permissions is that it is possible to use same tool to change the rules and 
document’s structure, which will give a better overview how security is applied. Also there 
is a straightforward solution through Velocity templates to initiate propagating the changes 
to the application. The algorithm used to capture permissions from the model is given as 
pseudo code: 
1. Find all Roles (RO), Resources (RC), Association classes (AC) 
2. Take next RO 
3. Find all R associated AC attributes (RACA) 
4. Take next RC 
5. Find all RC attributes (RCA) 
6. Search all association RACA -> RCA 
a. Evaluate R:=true if exists RACA -> RCA where RACA type = read 
b. Evaluate W:=true if exists RACA -> RCA where RACA type = 
write 
c. Evaluate I:=true if exists RACA -> RCA where RACA type = 
insert 
d. Evaluate D:=true if exists RACA -> RCA where RACA type = 
delete 
7. Write out RO>>RCA>>R,W,I,D<break> 
8. If exists more RC elements then go to 4, otherwise continue 
9. If exists more RO elements then go to 2, otherwise end. 
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6.7 Discussion 
Jin in [18] is close to our work. She uses UML to define RBAC rules to generate 
Extensible Access Control Mark-up Language system security rules out of the model. Also 
Matulevičius and Lakk in [25] have used SecureUML to generate PL/SQL database views 
and access control based on roles. The main difference of our work from all the others is 
that we model the permissions and resources using SecureUML and generate SQL 
sentences that can be directly executed in the application. We have also analysed the 
solution from modifying and merging the documents in the business process perspective in 
order to keep the information’s integrity. 
6.8 Summary 
In this chapter we defined new stereotypes to define RBAC model in SecureUML, 
discussed each of the stereotype in respect to modelling, and introduced how permissions 
are assigned to users. Also we introduced the method how to model simple XML Schemas 
using class diagrams and how to generate the class diagrams into SQL sentences using 
MagicDraw and Velocity templates. In the next part we will introduce our validation. 
  
  
42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART III 
Validation 
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Chapter 7:  Case study 
In this chapter we will introduce experiment that was conducted to test our contribution’s 
validity. It includes modelling, generating code and executing the code in our prototype. 
Experiment was conducted from 16
th
 to 19
th
 of April. The resources and permissions were 
modelled by an experiment group, pre-graduate students of University of Tartu on 18th of 
April 2013, associated to course Secure Software Design. The research point for our case 
study was: is it possible to use SecureUML together with RBAC on XML documents 
structure to fulfil a predefined business process in our prototype?  
The validation process contained of six main sub-processes: 
1. Defining business process as a UMLSec [19] diagram; 
2. Defining scenarios; 
3. Modelling resources (documents); 
4. Modelling RBAC in SecureUML; 
5. Generating SQL sentences to be inserted to the database; 
6. Testing the document workflow. 
First, we defined two business processes: purchase order and course subscription using 
UMLSec [19] notation (Appendix F).  
We will discuss the second scenario based on Figure 25. The process starts with student 
filling in an application: writing his contact info, previous studying and course he would 
like to participate. Then evaluation team views the application: they can only see the 
previous study info and applied course. They will mark the subscription as accepted or 
rejected. If the application was rejected, then the process stops. Otherwise, the application 
is sent to study committee who will see the document’s content and can add a scholarship 
decision. Next, the document is sent to an accountant who can see all fields in document 
and marks the payment as rejected or accepted. For each protected method we use 
association tags to relate them to roles. For example to give role  Evaluation team  
permission to addDecision we describe it:  
AT6#: 
{protected = addDecision} 
{role = (<username>, Evaluation team)} 
{right = (Evaluation team, addDecision)} 
 
The full list of association tags is given in Appendix F. The pre-defined process was used 
in the end to validate the document manipulation and merging. The operations used to 
manipulate the document are differently defined by experiment group but the document 
still go through the same lifecycle. 
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Figure 25 - UMLSec: Course subscription process 
Secondly textual scenarios were defined based on the process description (part of 
Appendix E). These descriptions of two processes were given to our experiment group to 
model resources and RBAC. The scenarios also included an example document which was 
used to model the resource (Appendix E). 
Modelling resources and RBAC in SecureUML was done by our experiment group. They 
were split into 4-6 student groups, nine groups altogether. The groups were generated by 
students themselves and the scenario was chosen randomly to the teams. They had 50 
minutes to describe the solution based on instructions.  
The pre-knowledge about modelling in SecureUML for the majority of the students was 
the same. They had had one 1.5h lecture about modelling in SecureUML which included 
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one practical exercise. The students did not know about participating in a validation 
process and were dealing the exercise as being a Secure Software Design course task. After 
gathering the SecureUML models we analysed them and concluded that the models need 
additional reviewing in order to be possible to use them in our prototype.  An example 
solution is in Figure 26. It contains of four role classes; one resource class and four 
association classes. Each role is assigned to the resource class which attributes are through 
abstract association (not visible from the figure) to the resource attributes.  
 
Figure 26 - Example solution - Course application 
After reviewing the models we used our Velocity templates to generate XML Schema and 
permissions as SQL sentences. The data update queries were excecuted in our application 
database. 
As a final step we tested the workflow of the process with the experiment group outcomes 
based on UMLSec diagrams given in Figure 25 and Appendix F. 
7.1 Results 
All the experiment groups were able to define SecureUML diagrams. From nine of the 
workgroups all generated role-based access control so that the models could be used with 
minimal add-ons to apply security. The adding of different attributes was based on the 
thesis team opinion. This is also one of threats to validity. 
Modelled class diagrams are added to the work as Appendix D (an example solution in 
Figure 26).  The count of manipulations done to the model is given in Table 5, where each 
column describes one working group.  
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Attributes definitions in Table 5: 
Roles defined – Number of RBAC roles defined by the group. 
Association classes defined – Number of correct association classes between role and 
resource. 
Permission attributes defined – Number of attributes defined in permission association 
classes. 
Permission attributes added – Number of additional attributes definitions added by us to 
the permission association classes. 
Resource classes defined – Number of resource classes defined. 
Resource classes added – Number of resource classes added to the diagram by us. 
Resource attributes defined – Number of attributes defined in resource classes. 
Resource attributes added – Number of attributes definition added to resource classes by 
us. 
PRR defined – Number of association combinations permission attribute, resource 
operation and resource attribute defined. 
PRR added – Number of association combinations permission attribute, resource 
operation and resource attribute added by us. 
Operations defined – Number of operations defined in the resource class. 
Process complete – Was it possible to go through the predefined process? (yes/no) 
Document complete - Was all the data manipulations reflected to the document? Was it 
reflecting the actual manipulations and did it contain all info added? (yes/no) 
 
Table 5 - Validation results 
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Roles defined 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4,0 
Association classes 
defined 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4,0 
Permission attributes 
defined 9 15 9 10 18 17 8 7 15 12,0 
Permission attributes 
added 1 0 1 0 0 3 12 6 2 3,4 
Resource classes defined 1 1 1 2 1 4 4 2 5 2,7 
Resource classes added 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0,3 
Resource attributes 
defined 10 8 13 8 14 17 16 12 16 13,7 
Resource attributes added 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0,3 
PRR defined 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,0 
PRR added 14 27 47 32 52 88 55 44 54 53,1 
Operations defined  14 14 3 6 8 0 16 9 22 9,1 
Process complete yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes yes   
Document complete yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes   
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All the groups were able to define correct roles and association classes. We added missing 
attributes and elements in order to make the models complete respect to our 
implementation. We tried to minimize the changes needed in changing the resource class, 
but defined as many permission attributes and PRR definitions as needed to support the 
flow. By manipulating the permission attributes and PRR we specified how the 
permissions were applied, but with minimal changes to resource class we ensured that the 
secured document structure varied in order to test our solution. By average we had 12 
permission attributes defined and added 3.4 attributes to the permission association class 
for one diagram. For Group5, Group8 and Group9 we also had to change the resource 
document as they did not define multiple occurrences element as a separate class. This 
limitation was found during the case study. It was also concluded that the most complex 
tasks, for experiment group, was to define permission attribute, resource operation and 
resource attribute associations. Only one team out of nine manage to define any of them.  
After adding missing concepts we followed predefined process (Appendix F) in the 
developed prototype, checked the possibility to fill the business process and that all content 
added or manipulated were reflected to the XML document. Eight out of nine teams 
solutions were able to finish the business flow. Group4 case failed as they had not 
specified a field to collect delivery date (in Purchase Order scenario), therefore we could 
not move through step “Specify delivery date”. Going through the process all teams 
solutions did not lose any data entered or modifications made.  
7.2 Threats to validity 
During the case study we also found couple of threats to the validity of our case study: 
1. None of the teams could create a fully working process. This could be due to the 50 
minutes timeframe to do the exercise, but can also be due to the complexity. 
2. All the additional manipulations were done by us in order to make the teams 
solutions work in our implementation. We are more focused on the working 
solution than in the groups’ vision of the security. 
3. The experiment group students were related to the performers – students from the 
same faculty. As the students did not know that they were part of a validation 
process this should be minimal. 
7.3 Summary 
The results show that our transformation rules can be used for the defined document and 
business process. We have shown that based on nine different document definitions and 
permission descriptions the associated business processes can be completed without losing 
any data in the process. The task to model SecureUML diagrams was harder than expected 
and the subjects could not finish totally the modelling in given 50 minutes. With reviewing 
the solutions and making minor updates the solutions were usable in respect to our 
prototype.  In the next chapter we will conclude our work and introduce future work. 
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Chapter 8:   Conclusions and Future 
Work 
In this chapter we summarize the main conclusions of our thesis. We present the 
limitations to the solution provided, summarize our studies and also introduce possible 
future work to improve our solution. 
In this thesis we provided a solution to integrate existing technology to dynamically define 
forms and security permissions without losing context information.  
8.1 Limitations 
We limited our solution to secure elements by their attribute name value. This means if two 
fields with the same name exist, they cannot be distinguished and it will be not clear which 
security policy to apply on them. To prevent that the field names in XML Schema has to be 
unique. When a multi-occurrence element is needed it has to be defined as a complex type 
for the merging to keep the XML document valid respect to the schema.  This limitation 
was noted in the case study. Although this limits possibility to model XML Schema, it 
does not limit permission calculations. If a complex form is needed, then the form can be 
defined with some other tool, modelled as a flat class in SecureUML (all fields as attributes 
in one class) and permissions assigned to the resource class.  
The connection between the server and the client is presumed to be secure, so the traffic of 
the data is not encrypted. The server and the client are treated as trusted parties.  
8.2 Conclusions 
The main research problem addressed in this work as stated in Chapter 1 is “Can 
existing technology be integrated to dynamically define forms and security without 
losing context based information?”. 
This research problem was divided into two research questions for investigation. We 
discuss the answers to the questions separately and then summarize the work. 
Can we dynamically define forms and permissions of the document? 
To answer this question we analysed an architecture solution with the support of 
modelling forms and RBAC permissions using SecureUML [25] language. We also 
developed Velocity [5] templates to generate codes from the models.   
Can we keep the document context complete when applying permissions on documents? 
We investigated how manipulations carried out on the document (adding/ 
substituting/ deleting data) affects its completeness. To secure documents we 
developed a transformer which gives to the displaying component only authorized 
information. To avoid losses upon modification of the document (as not all info 
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was visible) we introduced ELCA XmlMerge module [16] to ensure the context 
info completeness. By integrating the technology and implementing RBAC and 
document transformation we have a solution where forms and permissions are 
dynamically defined.  
As a result we created: SecureUML modelling strategy to dynamically control permissions 
and forms structure; Velocity templates to generate code from SecureUML models; 
application where the code is executed and RBAC and DynaForm [29] are implemented; 
solution in the server to keep the document content complete. This shows that it is possible 
to integrate together modelling tools and applications to create dynamic solutions. To 
validate the solution correctness we conducted a case study in respect to capturing all 
information from the models and documents context completeness.  
In the case study we analysed whether our proposed architecture and policy applying 
strategy worked.  Eight out of nine permission combinations, defined by subjects, were 
supporting the process in all steps. One solution missed a field definition so the process 
was not complete. In all of the cases all permission were captured from the model and the 
context data was intact after every data manipulation from the application. The results from 
the case study verify that we are able to generate solution from existing technologies that 
dynamically defines form and its permissions.  
8.3 Future work 
In the current study we use our own Domain-Specific Language [14] to define permissions 
on resource files. As one of the improvements, we could use XML based structure (for 
example XACML [28]) for defining permissions to make the solution more uniform. Also 
more business processes and documents could be defined to be able to find the additional 
needs to the documents and the process. In order to improve the solution we could combine 
structure based security together with file level security. Additionally the XML Schema 
[35] could be improved to be able to hold info on the visual output of the fields: i.e. field 
length, where to get data and field titles in multiple languages. 
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Dünaamiline rollipõhine ligipääsu kontroll  
XML dokumentidele 
Magistritöö 
Kaarel Tark 
 
Kokkuvõte 
 
Tänapäeval hoitakse enamus dokumente elektroonsetel andmekandjatel. Samaaegselt 
kasvab andmete maht ja vajadus nende kiireks transportimiseks. Dokumendid võivad 
sisaldada salajast või infot, mis valede osapoolte käes võib olla ohtlik või tähendada 
äririske, mis tekitab vajadust dokumentide sisu kaitsta. Peamiselt käsitletakse dokumenti 
kui tervikut – kuulutatakse terve dokument näiteks salastatuks. Selline lähenemisviis ei ole 
alati põhjendatud ja osaliselt võib dokumendi sisu siiski olla avalik: näiteks anonüümsete 
uuringute tegemiseks. 
Rollipõhine ligipääsu kontroll (inglise keeles – Role Based Access Control) on meetod 
defineerimaks kasutajate õiguseid infosüsteemis vastavalt neile omistatud rollidele. 
Turvameetmete defineerimine ja realiseerimine on aeganõudev töö, mida tihti tehakse 
paralleelselt või pärast rakenduse loogika realiseerimist.  
Lahenduseks probleemile pakume rollipõhist ligipääsukontrolli dünaamiliselt 
defineeritavatele dokumentidel. Kuna dokumendid võivad olla oma mahult suured, siis 
defineerime õigused dokumendi struktuuri tasandil (XML Schema).  Kontrolli ja 
dokumendi vormi modelleerimiseks kasutame SecureUML notatsiooni, mis on UML’i 
laiendus. Antud mudelist genereerime SQL koodi, mida andmebaasis jooksutades saame 
muudatused viia mudelist serveri rakendusse. Server vastutab antud privileegide ja 
dokumendi struktuuri kaitstud osade eest ja annab välja ainult antud rollile lubatud infot. 
Antud töö raames teostatud uuring näitas, et on võimalik modelleerida nii vorm kui 
õigused nii, et ligipääsupiiranguid omavad andmed on kaitstud. Kuvatavate andmete 
muutmisel ja lisamisel ei rikuta olemasoleva dokumendi terviklikkust ja andmed säilivad.   
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Appendix A – RBAC and XML 
Schema Velocity template  
Velocity template to generate XML Schema and permissions update SQL sentence. Used 
in MagicDraw after modelling the document and RBAC rules. 
#foreach ($diagram in $Diagram) 
#set($eList = $report.getDiagramElements($diagram)) 
update document_template set permissions = '#foreach ($role 
in $eList) 
#if($report.containsStereotype($role, "secuml.role"))  
#foreach ($form in $eList) 
#if($report.containsStereotype($form, "secuml.resource"))  
#foreach($attributes in $form.ownedAttribute) 
#if($attributes.name == "ID") 
#set($formId = $attributes.defaultValue) 
#end##if 
#set($attributeClass="") 
#foreach ($formClass in $eList) 
#if($report.containsStereotype($formClass, 
"secuml.resource")) 
#if($attributes.type.name == $formClass.name) 
#set($attributeClass = $attributes.type.name) 
#end##if 
#end##if 
#end##foreach 
#if($attributeClass!="")  
#set($fieldName = $attributeClass) 
#end##if 
#if($attributeClass=="") 
#set($fieldName = $attributes.name) 
#end##if 
#set($hasRead = "-") 
#set($hasWrite = "-") 
#set($hasInsert = "-") 
#set($hasDelete= "-") 
#foreach($roleAssociationClass in $AssociationClass) 
#if($report.containsStereotype($roleAssociationClass, 
"secuml.permission")) 
#if($roleAssociationClass.relatedElement.get(1).name == 
$role.name || 
$roleAssociationClass.relatedElement.get(0).name == 
$role.name)  
#foreach($associationProp in 
$roleAssociationClass.ownedAttribute) 
#foreach($roleRight in 
$report.getRelationship($associationProp)) 
#if($attributes.name==$roleRight.target.get(0).name) 
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#if($associationProp.type.name == "read")  
#set($hasRead="R") 
#end##if 
#if($associationProp.type.name == "write")  
#set($hasWrite="W") 
#end##if 
#if($associationProp.type.name == "insert")  
#set($hasInsert="I") 
#end##if 
#if($associationProp.type.name == "delete")  
#set($hasDelete="D") 
#end##if 
#end##if 
#end##foreach 
#end##foreach 
#end##if 
#end##if 
#end##foreach 
#if($fieldName != "" && $fieldName != 
"ID")$role.name<>$fieldName>>$hasRead,$hasWrite,$hasInsert,$h
asDelete<break>#end##if 
#end##foreach 
#end##if 
#end##forearch  
#end##if 
#end##foreach 
' ,  
TEMPLATE_XSD='<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
elementFormDefault="qualified" 
attributeFormDefault="unqualified"> 
#foreach ($form in $eList) 
#if($report.containsStereotype($form, "xml.schema"))  
<xs:element name="$form.name"> 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs:sequence> 
#set($i = 0) 
#set($j = 0) 
#foreach($attributes in $form.ownedAttribute) 
#set($isSimple = 1) 
#foreach($types in $eList) 
#if($attributes.type.name==$types.name && 
$attributes.name!="" && $attributes.name!="ID") 
#set($string = $attributes.multiplicity) 
#set($mult = $string.split("\..")) 
#set($minoccurs="1") 
#set($maxoccurs="1") 
#set($Integer=0) 
#if($Integer.parseInt($mult.get(0))>0) 
#set($minoccurs="$mult.get(0)") 
#end##if 
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#if($mult.get(1)=="*") 
#set($maxoccurs="unbounded") 
#end##if 
#if($Integer.parseInt($mult.get(1))>0) 
#set($maxoccurs=$mult.get(1)) 
#end##if 
<xs:element name="$attributes.name"> 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="$attributes.type.name" 
minOccurs="$minoccurs" maxOccurs="$maxoccurs"> 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs:sequence> 
#foreach($attrib in $types.ownedAttribute) 
#set($string = $attrib.multiplicity) 
#set($mult = $string.split("\..")) 
#set($minoccurs="1") 
#set($maxoccurs="1") 
#set($Integer=0) 
#if($Integer.parseInt($mult.get(0))>0) 
#set($minoccurs="$mult.get(0)") 
#end##if 
#if($mult.get(1)=="*") 
#set($maxoccurs="unbounded") 
#end##if 
#if($Integer.parseInt($mult.get(1))>0) 
#set($maxoccurs=$mult.get(1)) 
#end##if 
<xs:element name="$attrib.name" 
type="xs:$attrib.type.name.toLowerCase()" 
minOccurs="$minoccurs" maxOccurs="$maxoccurs"/> 
#end##foreach 
</xs:sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
</xs:sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
#set ($isSimple = 0) 
#end##if 
#end##foreach 
#if($isSimple == 1  && $attributes.name!="" && 
$attributes.name!="ID") 
#set($string = $attributes.multiplicity) 
#set($mult = $string.split("\..")) 
#set($minoccurs="1") 
#set($maxoccurs="1") 
#set($Integer=0) 
#if($Integer.parseInt($mult.get(0))>0) 
#set($minoccurs="$mult.get(0)") 
#end##if 
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#if($mult.get(1)=="*") 
#set($maxoccurs="unbounded") 
#end##if 
#if($Integer.parseInt($mult.get(1))>0) 
#set($maxoccurs=$mult.get(1)) 
#end##if 
#set($simpleComplex=0) 
#if($maxoccurs!="1") 
<xs:element name="$attributes.name" > 
<xs:complexType> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="$attributes.name" 
type="xs:$attributes.type.name.toLowerCase()" 
minOccurs="$minoccurs" maxOccurs="$maxoccurs"/> 
</xs:sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
#end##if 
#if($maxoccurs=="1") 
<xs:element name="$attributes.name" 
type="xs:$attributes.type.name.toLowerCase()" 
minOccurs="$minoccurs" maxOccurs="$maxoccurs"/> 
#end##if 
#end##if 
#end##foreach 
</xs:sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
</xs:element> 
#end##if 
#end##foreach 
</xs:schema>' 
where id=$formId.value; 
#end##foreach 
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Appendix B – RBAC Permissions 
Velocity template  
Velocity template to generate permissions update SQL sentence. Used in MagicDraw if 
only RBAC rules are modelled. Document is modelled with some other tool. 
#foreach ($diagram in $Diagram) 
#set($eList = $report.getDiagramElements($diagram)) 
update document_template set permissions = '#foreach ($role 
in $eList) 
#if($report.containsStereotype($role, "secuml.role"))  
#foreach ($form in $eList) 
#if($report.containsStereotype($form, "secuml.resource"))  
#foreach($attributes in $form.ownedAttribute) 
#if($attributes.name == "ID") 
#set($formId = $attributes.defaultValue) 
#end##if 
#set($attributeClass="") 
#foreach ($formClass in $eList) 
#if($report.containsStereotype($formClass, 
"secuml.resource")) 
#if($attributes.type.name == $formClass.name) 
#set($attributeClass = $attributes.type.name) 
#end##if 
#end##if 
#end##foreach 
#if($attributeClass!="")  
#set($fieldName = $attributeClass) 
#end##if 
#if($attributeClass=="") 
#set($fieldName = $attributes.name) 
#end##if 
#set($hasRead = "-") 
#set($hasWrite = "-") 
#set($hasInsert = "-") 
#set($hasDelete= "-") 
#foreach($roleAssociationClass in $AssociationClass) 
#if($report.containsStereotype($roleAssociationClass, 
"secuml.permission")) 
#if($roleAssociationClass.relatedElement.get(1).name == 
$role.name || 
$roleAssociationClass.relatedElement.get(0).name == 
$role.name)  
#foreach($associationProp in 
$roleAssociationClass.ownedAttribute) 
#foreach($roleRight in 
$report.getRelationship($associationProp)) 
#if($attributes.name==$roleRight.target.get(0).name) 
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#if($associationProp.type.name == "read")  
#set($hasRead="R") 
#end##if 
#if($associationProp.type.name == "write")  
#set($hasWrite="W") 
#end##if 
#if($associationProp.type.name == "insert")  
#set($hasInsert="I") 
#end##if 
#if($associationProp.type.name == "delete")  
#set($hasDelete="D") 
#end##if 
#end##if 
#end##foreach 
#end##foreach 
#end##if 
#end##if 
#end##foreach 
#if($fieldName != "" && $fieldName != 
"ID")$role.name<>$fieldName>>$hasRead,$hasWrite,$hasInsert,$h
asDelete<break>#end##if 
#end##foreach 
#end##if 
#end##forearch  
#end##if 
#end##foreach 
'  
where id=$formId.value; 
#end##foreach 
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Appendix C – Relational Database 
Model 
Server side relational database model. Document content holds the latest content of the 
XML. Document version hold all previous versions of a document. Document template 
contains info about the form and permissions. To define a new document we need to define 
a document template entry: 
 ID – unique identifier for the form (has to match model resource attribute ID) 
NAME – name for the document; 
 TEMPLATE_XSD – XML Schema definition for the form; 
 PERMISSIONS – permissions for the document; 
 DESCRIPTION – free text describing the document; 
 OWNER – Owner name for the document (not used in our prototype). 
 
  
 class database
DOCUMENT_CONTENT
«column»
*PK ID:  INTEGER
* VERSION_NR:  INTEGER
* NAME:  TEXT
* CONTEXT_XML:  TEXT
*FK DOCUMENT_TEMPLATE_ID:  INTEGER
 OWNER:  VARCHAR(45)
 SYS_DELETE_STATUS:  CHAR(1) = 'N'
«PK»
+ PK_document_content(INTEGER)
«FK»
+ FK_DOC_CONTENT_DOC_TEMPLATE(INTEGER)
DOCUMENT_CONTENT_VERSION
«column»
*PK ID:  INTEGER
*FK DOCUMENT_CONTENT_ID:  INTEGER
* VERSION_NR:  INTEGER
* CONTENT_XML:  TEXT
 CHANGER:  VARCHAR(45)
«PK»
+ PK_DOCUMENT_CONTENT_VERSION(INTEGER)
«FK»
+ FK_DOC_CONTENT_VERSION_DOC_CONTENT(INTEGER)
DOCUMENT_TEMPLATE
«column»
*PK ID:  INTEGER
* NAME:  TEXT
* TEMPLATE_XSD:  TEXT
 PERMISSIONS:  TEXT
 DESCRIPTION:  TEXT
 OWNER:  VARCHAR(45)
«PK»
+ PK_DOCUMENT_TEMPLATE(INTEGER)
0..*«FK»1
0..*
«FK»
1
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Appendix D – Source code and 
models 
Structure of CD: 
/application/ - prototype application associated filed. 
/application/compiled/ - compiled war files of AddServiceServer.war (server) and 
dynaform.war (client). 
/application/source/ - zipped source of projects. 
/application/database/ - database related files: create_database.txt (schema and tables 
creation scripts); database_server_conf.txt (database configuration); insert_* (database 
example data insert scripts). 
/modelling/  - modelling related files. 
/modelling/case study/ - case study diagrams as MagicDraw file. 
/modelling/velocity templates/ - Velocity templates used to generate code in MagicDraw 
from models: permissions.txt (for only permissions generation), 
permissions_and_xml_schema.txt (for permissions and schema generation).  
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Appendix E – Case study 
Principles of Secure Software Design 
RBAC Application to Secure Documents 
Workshop 18.04.2013 
 
 
Goal: For the given scenario create the RBAC model in SecureUML (class diagram). 
 
 
Task 1. Elicit the relevant RBAC information. Answer the following questions: 
 
1.1. What are the objects (e.g., in your scenario document) and their attributes? 
 
Note: it is expected that you will characterise the document regarding its 
contents, i.e., field, entries. For instance, in the case of the Phonebook, 
its field entries are its name, issue year, list of persons; A person could 
be characterise by its name and phone number. 
 
1.2. What are operations that changes values of the attributes?  
 
1.3. What are the roles?  
 
1.4. What are the security actions?  
Note: the following security actions and their meanings could be used: 
- Read – element value is visible. 
- Write – if the element is visible (allowed to read) then it is allowed to 
change the value. 
- Insert – if multiple sections (form field multiplicity) allowed, then it is 
possible to add another section. 
- Delete – allowed removing elements. 
 
 
Task 2. Model the RBAC solution. Apply the template given in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: RBAC template 
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2.1. Model the resource (i.e. document) that needs to be protected. 
- Define classes of secure resources; 
- Define field entries as class attributes; 
- Define attribute types. Simple (i.e., the which needs to be secured) attribute types 
for an element: 
o String data types: string.  
o Date data types: date, time, datetime.  
o Numeric data types: integer, long, int, short, byte, decimal.  
o Miscellaneous data types: boolean.  
- Define complex types for logical groups. For example: contact information of a 
person can be a complex type containing of personName and phoneNumber 
attributes. 
 
2.2. Define the attribute multiplicities 
Note: Define attributes multiplicity: 1, 1..*, 0..*, 0..5, etc. By default 1. For 
example (see Figure 2) a person have 0..* friends, but he can make a 
party where he can invite 0 to 20 (0..20) persons as the pub does not 
have more places. 
 
 
Figure 2: Secure resource definition 
 
2.3. Model the roles and their permissions.  
Security action model is given in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Security actions 
 
2.4. Define the security authorisation constraints (textually). This means, describe the link 
between the security actions of the roles and the resource operations (over the attributes). 
For example:  
<permission attribute> – <resource opertation> – <resource attribute> 
obtainPersonsPhoneNumber:READ – readPhoneNumber() – phoneNumber 
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Scenario 1: Order document / Client placing a purchase order 
 
The process starts with client filling in an order form. Client specifies his contact info and 
requested items and sends the request to the seller. Seller views the purchase order and 
assigns unit codes and prices to the offering and sends the document to delivery team. 
Delivery department will specify when they can ship the package to the client. After the 
offering is complete it will be sent back to the client for acceptance. If the client refuses the 
offering, then the process stops and the document is deleted. If the offering is accepted by 
the client the document is sent to the accounting department who will transmission a credit 
card payment. If the payment is accepted, then accounting department will mark the order 
as being paid and send it to delivery department. The delivery department will pack and 
ship the ordered items and mark the order as shipped. 
 
Roles: client, seller, accounting, delivery department 
 
Purchase order – form 
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Application  (form 2): Application for Japanese course 
 
The process starts with student filling in the subscription. Student specifies his contact 
information, school and current grade point average and registered course number. The 
subscription requests are sent to an evaluation team in the university who will not see the 
actual contact information of the subscriber, but only the previous study information, 
student SSN and course the student would like to register to. The evaluation team will 
mark requirements filled or not filled. If the if the requirements are not filled then the 
document is rejected, process stops and the student is notified. If the requirements are 
filled, then it is sent to study committee, who will decide in what amount or if any the 
course cost will be funded by a scholarship. The committee can only view the application 
with an exception to add scholarship amount to the document. After the committee has 
made its decision the document is sent to accounting department to approve payment. If 
the payment is accepted, then the accounting department marks it as paid. 
 
Roles: student, study committee, evaluation team, accounting 
 
 
Application for Japanese Courses – form 
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Appendix F – UMLSec process 
diagrams 
Describes business processes used in validation process. First process describes purchase 
order document, then second one course subscription. 
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AT1#: 
{protected = addOrderLines and addClientInfo} 
{role = (<username>, Client)} 
{right = (Client, addOrderLine and addClientInfo)} 
 
AT2#: 
{protected = viewRows and viewClient } 
{role = (<username>, Salesman)} 
{right = (Salesman, viewRows and viewClient)} 
 
AT3#: 
{protected = addUnitCodes and addPrices} 
{role = (<username>, Salesman)} 
{right = (Salesman, addUnitCodes and addPrices)} 
 
AT4#: 
{protected = viewOrderedProduct and viewDeliveryAddress} 
{role = (<username>, Delivery Team)} 
{right = (Delivery Team, viewOrderedProduct and viewDeliveryAddress)} 
 
AT5#: 
{protected = addTransportation} 
{role = (<username>, Delivery Team)} 
{right = (Delivery Team, addTransportation)} 
 
AT6#: 
{protected = writeClient, writeRows and viewTransportation} 
{role = (<username>, Client)} 
{right = (Client, viewClient,viewRows and viewTransportaion)} 
 
AT7#: 
{protected = viewClient, viewRows, viewPrices, viewTransportation and 
viewCreditCardInfo} 
{role = (<username>, Accounting)} 
{right = (Accounting, viewClient, viewRows, viewPrices, viewTransportation and 
viewCreditCardInfo)} 
 
AT8#: 
{protected = viewCreditCardInfo and setPaymentStatus} 
{role = (<username>, Accounting)} 
{right = (Accounting, viewCreditCardInfo and setPaymentStatus)} 
 
AT9#: 
{protected = setDelivered} 
{role = (<username>, Delivery Team)} 
{right = (Delivery Team, setDelivered)} 
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 AT1#: 
{protected = addContractInformation, addPreviousStudies and addParticipatingCourse} 
{role = (<username>, Student)} 
{right = (Student, addContractInformation, addPreviousStudies and 
addParticipatingCourse)} 
 
AT2#: 
{protected = viewPreviousStudies and viewParticipatingCourse} 
{role = (<username>, Evaluation team)} 
{right = (Evaluation team, viewPreviousStudies and viewParticipatingCourse)} 
 
AT3#: 
{protected = addDecision} 
{role = (<username>, Evaluation team)} 
{right = (Evaluation team, addDecision)} 
 
AT4#: 
{protected = viewContactInformation, viewPreviousStudies, viewParticipatingCourse and 
viewDecision} 
{role = (<username>, Study committee)} 
{right = (Study committee, viewContactInformation, viewPreviousStudies, 
viewParticipatingCourse and viewDecision)} 
 
AT5#: 
{protected = addScholarshipDecision} 
{role = (<username>, Study committee)} 
{right = (Study committee, addScholarshipDecision)} 
 
 
AT6#: 
{protected = viewContactInformation, viewParticipatingCourse and 
viewScholarshipDecision} 
{role = (<username>, Accountant)} 
{right = (Accountant, viewContactInformation, viewParticipatingCourse and 
viewScholarshipDecision)} 
 
AT7#: 
{protected = addPaymentStatus} 
{role = (<username>, Accountant)} 
{right = {(Accountant, addPaymentStatus)} 
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